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1 Introduction
Let me start by congratulating IDS on its fortieth
anniversary. Over the past four decades, the Institute
has become an essential foundation for and major
contributor to development debates. I am therefore
both happy and proud to have been invited to
participate in this special event and to offer my
reflections as a senior economist at the United Nations.
The current world economic system exhibits many
positive features. It is certainly a dynamic system, with
great capacity to innovate and great flexibility to
adapt to changing circumstances. And it is a
competitive system that is enabling many producers in
developing countries to get a foothold in global
markets. Yet, as we well know, the world economic
system also faces major challenges. Some of the most
recognised are those associated with environmental
degradation – not only climate change but also the
rapid loss of biodiversity and the deterioration in the
quality of air and water. In recent economic debates,
the challenge of maintaining macroeconomic stability
in the global economic system has also been
emphasised. It means reckoning with the large global
imbalances and with the rapid rise of unregulated
financial activities which together generate the risk of
large global financial disturbances.
Despite the crucial importance of these two
challenges, I want to concentrate my attention in
these remarks on a third: the uneven distribution of
the benefits of economic growth. This involves two
quite different dimensions: the uneven distribution of
income among countries and the uneven distribution
of income within countries.
2 Growing inequalities
The international income inequality gap involves
longstanding and still growing North–South
disparities. This gap has been widening over the past
two centuries, with only brief interruptions, including
during the last three years of booming world
economic growth. If we exempt this recent period,
we see a significant rise in inequality between
developed and developing countries since the 1980s;
particularly a sharp rise in the gap between the
extremes, between high-income and low-income
countries. The most troubling pattern, which is largely
responsible for this widening inequality over the past
25 years, has been the large number of growth
collapses in many parts of the developing world:
sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Latin America
and the Caribbean, and Central and Eastern Europe.
We have also seen important changes within the
North and South groupings. In the industrialised
world, the USA has again become the leading
economy in terms of economic growth – in sharp
contrast with the pattern observed during the
postwar ‘golden age’ between 1950 and 1973.
Meanwhile, slow economic growth in most parts of
the developing world has been accompanied by
booms in South Asia and, particularly, in East Asia.
The second dimension – growing inequality of
income distribution within countries – is much more
broad-based. According to research undertaken by
the United Nations University’s World Institute for
Development Economic Research, 48 out of 73
countries for which such information is available
experienced a deterioration of income distribution
during the past three decades, and most of them in
a substantial way, including major economies such as
China, Russia and the USA. And those 48 countries
contain 87.5 per cent of the population of the
sample countries. Only nine countries, representing
2.7 per cent of the sample population, experienced a
clear improvement in income distribution. In the rest,
income distribution remained essentially unchanged.
What these numbers mean is that approximately nine
out of ten of the world’s citizens live in countries
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where income distribution has deteriorated. This is a
staggering figure. But we have not yet recognised this
inequality for what it is: a truly global pandemic.
3 Asymmetries in the international economic
system
A simple way to understand the forces that underlie
international inequalities is to look at the three basic
asymmetries of the current international economic
system.
The first is the greater macroeconomic vulnerability of
developing countries to external shocks. This vulnerability
has tended to increase with the tighter integration
of the world economy, and its nature has also been
changing. While the transmission of external shocks
through trade remains important, financial shocks
have come to play a more prominent role, revisiting
past patterns, such as the financial boom-and-bust
cycle of the 1920s and 1930s.
In this sense, macroeconomic asymmetries derive
both from the fact that the currencies of industrial
countries serve as the international currencies and
that, although all capital markets are pro-cyclical,
capital flows to developing countries are particularly
volatile. Moreover, whereas macroeconomic policy in
developed countries tends to be counter-cyclical and
can thus smooth out the effects of pro-cyclical
financial markets, pro-cyclical macroeconomic
policies in developing countries tend to reinforce the
capital account and trade cycles. That is, developing
countries lack the room for manoeuvre to adopt
counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. At the
same time, market players expect this and evaluate
authorities in the developing world on their ability to
adopt such pro-cyclical stances.
The second asymmetry derives from the high
concentration of technical progress in the developed
countries. The diffusion of technical progress from the
source countries to the rest of the world remains
‘relatively slow and uneven’, according to Raúl
Prebisch’s classical predicament. This reflects, among
other factors, the prohibitive costs of entry into the
more dynamic technological activities and the rising
costs of technology transfers due to the generalisation
and strengthening of intellectual property rights. The
combined effect of these factors explains why, at the
global level, the productive structure has exhibited a
high and persistent concentration of technical progress
in the industrialised countries, which thus maintain
their dominant position in the most dynamic sectors
of international trade and their hegemony in the
establishment of large transnational enterprises.
The third asymmetry is associated with the contrast
between the high mobility of capital and the restrictions
on the international movement of labour, particularly of
unskilled labour. This asymmetry is characteristic of the
present phase of globalisation, as it was not
manifested in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries (a period characterised by large mobility of
both capital and labour) or in the first 25 years
following the Second World War (a period in which
both factors exhibited little mobility). As Dani Rodrik
emphasised, asymmetries in the international
mobility of the factors of production generate biases
in the distribution of income in favour of the more
mobile factors (capital and skilled labour) and against
the less mobile factors (less skilled labour). They also
affect relations between developed and developing
countries, in as much as the latter have a relative
abundance of less skilled labour.
4 Overcoming global asymmetries
Since the creation of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the early
1960s, the need to correct the asymmetries that
continue to characterise the international economic
system has been explicitly recognised. The
commitments concerning the flow of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) and ‘special and
differential treatment’ for developing countries in
trade issues were some of the partial although
relatively frustrating results of this effort to build a
‘new international economic order’. This vision has
eroded dramatically in recent decades and has been
supplanted by an alternative paradigm, according to
which the basic objective of the international
economic system should be to ensure a uniform set
of rules – a ‘level playing field’– leading to the
efficient functioning of market forces.
It is important to underline that, contrary to this
trend, new principles were agreed in the area of
sustainable development at the outset of the 1990s,
notably Principle 7 of the Earth Summit of Rio de
Janeiro in 1992, which focused on the ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities’ of developed and
developing countries.
In the new vision of the international economic
system stressing the need for a level playing field, the
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essential gains for developing countries lie in the
eventual dismantling of protection of ‘sensitive’
sectors in industrialised countries, in the guarantees
that export sectors derive from an international
trading system with clear and stable rules, and in the
design of preventive macroeconomic policies that
serve as ‘self-protection’ against international
financial volatility. The correction of international
asymmetries is recognised only in relation to the
provision of ODA to the least developed countries.
Even though all these gains would be desirable,
could they be sufficient in themselves to generate a
greater convergence in levels of development? Given
the strength of existing asymmetries, the answer is
probably no. In certain situations, taking the
envisioned measures could even aggravate existing
inequalities. Moreover, as Ha-Joon Chang, among
others, has emphasised, levelling the playing field,
the norm that has guided efforts to reform the
international economic system in recent decades,
implies restrictions on developing countries that the
industrialised countries themselves never faced in
previous periods of their history: standards of
intellectual property protection originating from the
industrialised countries that generate technology and
limitations on policy options for promoting new
production sectors for either domestic or external
markets. Thus, the concept of ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities’, the already classic
principle of ‘special and differential treatment’, and
the need to maintain ‘policy space’ for developing
countries, may be more appropriate guidelines for
building a more equitable global order.
These considerations point to the essential elements
that should guide international economic reform vis-
à-vis the developing countries. The first of the
asymmetries suggests that the basic function of the
international financial institutions, from the
perspective of the developing countries, is to
compensate for the pro-cyclical impact of financial
markets, smoothing financial boom-and-bust at its
source through adequate regulation, and providing a
larger degree of freedom for countries to adopt
counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. This implies,
in turn, adequate surveillance during boom periods in
order to avoid accumulating excessive
macroeconomic and financial risks, and adequate
financing during crises in order to smooth the
required adjustment in the face of ‘sudden stops’ of
external financing. An additional and equally essential
function is to act as a countervailing force to the
concentration of credit in private capital markets,
making resources available to countries and
economic agents that have limited access to credit in
international capital markets.
The second asymmetry suggests that the multilateral
trade system must facilitate the smooth transfer to
developing countries of the production of primary
commodities, technologically mature manufacturing
activities and standardised services. It should,
therefore, avoid erecting obstacles to such transfers
through protection or subsidies. Moreover, this
system must also accelerate developing countries’
access to technology and ensure their increasing
participation in the generation of technology and in
the production of goods and services with high
technological content.
In light of the problems that developing countries
face in ensuring a dynamic transformation of their
productive structures, a ‘special and differential
treatment’ is required, particularly in two critical
areas: (1) regimes for intellectual property protection
that avoid creating excessive costs for developing
countries and limiting the modalities through which
the transfer can be made; and (2) instruments to
promote new exports (‘infant export industries’),
which foster diversification and increase their value-
added. All this clearly requires maintaining the ‘policy
space’ to adopt active industrial (and, more generally,
production sector) policies, as well as a search for
appropriate instruments in order to avoid a sterile
competition among countries to attract footloose
industries.
Lastly, to overcome the third asymmetry, labour
migration must be fully included in the international
agenda, at the global and the regional levels, and
development concerns must be mainstreamed in the
migration policies of both countries of origin and
destination. Moreover, international agreements must
envisage complementary mechanisms to facilitate
migration, such as the recognition of educational,
professional, and labour credentials, the transferability
of social security benefits, and the facilitation and
reduction of costs of transferring remittances.
5 Facing domestic inequalities
Despite its potential to manage international
inequalities, the international system does not have a
clear capacity to help address income distribution
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within countries. Social policy and the management
of social cohesion have been and will continue to be
the domain of nation states – at least in the
foreseeable future. Given that scenario, what we
could certainly do at the international level is seek to
ensure that international rules do not constrain the
space for social policy or social cohesion within any
country, whether industrialised or developing.
At the national level, placing the need to redress
inequalities at the centre of economic and social
policies requires, first, active and consistent human
development efforts, supported by adequate fiscal
resources. The experiences of developing countries
show that major advances in human development
can be achieved, even at relatively low levels of
income. The same is true of the allocation of fiscal
resources to social spending. For example, in Latin
America, some countries assign only 6 per cent of
gross domestic product (GDP) to social spending,
while others allocate over 20 per cent. Thus, the
allocation of adequate amounts of fiscal resources to
social spending is, in a significant sense, a policy
choice. Yet, for low-income countries, this requires
consistent provision of ODA, and thus the meeting
by all industrial countries of the United Nations
target of 0.7 per cent of the gross national income
(GNI) in ODA. Other international factors may also
be crucial. It is important, in particular, to reflect on
whether the adequate allocation of government
revenues for social spending has become increasingly
constrained by the world competition to reduce
taxation of capital income.
Nonetheless, progress in human development, while
essential in itself and necessary to guarantee access
to economic opportunities, cannot alone bring social
progress. Equally, and perhaps even more
challenging, is to guarantee that economic growth is
inclusive. The ‘inclusiveness’ of economic growth is
certainly not an automatic outcome of market forces
and must be ensured through explicit public choices.
These choices involve at least three dimensions.
First, is placing employment at the centre of economic
policy, including the actions of independent central banks.
The capacity of economic growth to generate decent
and productive employment, especially for the
poorest, is just as important as growth itself.
Employment generation is, in fact, the key link
between economic and social progress. Unfortunately,
we are seeing, in every region of the world,
inadequate generation of quality employment, even in
developing countries experiencing rapid economic
growth. And the growing under-utilisation of labour
has exacerbated productivity gaps between different
economic agents in developing countries, particularly
between workers engaged in formal economic
activities and those engaged in informal ones.
Second, is to address the growing vulnerability to risks
faced by workers and, more generally, by the poor,
including: the insecurity in incomes and jobs
generated by more competitive environments, the
more volatile economic growth environment
experienced by many developing countries, the
underdevelopment of social protection systems in
most developing countries, and the difficulties
experienced by many social security systems in
middle- and high-income countries, which has led to
the privatisation of risks. This means moving beyond
the narrow conception of social protection systems
as compensatory mechanisms for adverse social
effects generated by economic processes – that is, as
mere ‘social safety nets’. It requires integrated
economic and social policies that aim at preventing
crises and developing permanent social protection
systems, based on the principles of solidarity and
universal coverage, and that manage basic risks in an
integrated way, particularly nutrition, health,
disability, ageing and unemployment. It will,
admittedly, take longer to develop such systems in
countries where the labour force is largely rural or
informal, but this should be the ultimate objective of
efforts in this area.
The third dimension, is placing the issue of growing
income and wealth inequalities at the centre of
economic policies. A comparison of income inequality
among industrialised countries shows that those
with a better distribution of income also have a
more developed social welfare state. But this means
confronting the growing share of capital income that
characterises the world economy today and the bias
in demand for labour towards high skills, which has
led to a worsening distribution of labour income
between skilled and unskilled workers. Progressive
income taxation is essential for this task, but is an
instrument that seems to be under increasing stress
in the current global environment. Perhaps we need
even more ambitious policies on that front. And
helping the poor and even the middle classes to build
assets should be a priority of economic policies. This
includes access to housing and the development of
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productive assets, which will be critical for the
development of small and medium enterprises. As
we well know, these firms and productive self-
employment are major mechanisms for job creation
worldwide.
Cutting across these three dimensions of public choice
is the essential need to develop a genuinely integrated
approach to economic and social development. This
will in turn require not only a change in outlook, but
new institutions to support the development of
integrated policy frameworks. At the national level,
these integrated frameworks ought to start by
designing rules to ensure the ‘visibility’ of the social
effects of economic policies and by asking
macroeconomic authorities (including independent
central banks) regularly to examine the effects of
policies on the main social variables, particularly
employment and incomes of workers. Similarly,
finance ministers should be asked to include analysis of
likely distributive effects in any budgetary or tax reform
initiative presented to their legislatures. And public
entities entrusted with technological, industrial, or
agricultural policies ought regularly to evaluate the
distributional consequences of their programmes. The
integrated frameworks should ultimately be developed
into efficient coordination systems between economic
and social authorities, in which social objectives are
effectively mainstreamed into economic policy
decision-making – that is, into monetary, fiscal, trade,
production, and technology policies.
6 Implications for development research
We were asked to reflect in the IDS40 conference on
the implications of our views for development
research. Let me underscore three, which are also
relevant for development cooperation. The first is that
the fight against inequality, both international and
domestic, should be brought to the centre of
international cooperation and rule-making and to the
centre of development policies. The second is that
focusing on domestic governance and policies in
developing countries, the central focus of attention of
orthodox development thinking over the past decades,
and the focus of development cooperation today, is
likely to be insufficient. It is equally important to think
about rules that allow the benefits of global trade,
investment and finance to spread among all members
of the international economy. The third is that such
rules should maintain ‘policy space’ for developing
countries to pursue their development strategies and,
crucially, to guarantee that development is pursued
with a strong equity dimension.
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